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Abstract: In Legal Determinants of External Finance, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez‐de‐Silanes,
Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (“LLSV”) argue that the reason that some countries have
bigger capital markets than others can be traced to the legal origin of the country i.e. whether it
is a common law or a civil law jurisdiction.
This paper explores the LLSV thesis in the context of Canada, which is a common law
jurisdiction that also is home to Quebec which has a civil law tradition.
Three issues are examined in this paper: first, how and why Canada fared relatively well in the
recent financial crisis; second, why Canada has not yet created a national securities regulator;
and third, how Quebec, a civil law jurisdiction, operates within an overarching common law
framework , and the implications of this cross‐fertilization of systems.
These three issues are explored by examining the development of various investor protection
laws and structures over time in Canada (as opposed to examining investor protection laws at a
point in time, as the LLSV studies do), and also by providing context to explain why certain rules
and structures have been adapted and others, while economically efficient, may have been
rejected.
In Canada, as in many other jurisdictions, securities laws and securities structure have an
impact on investor protection, as do banking laws and the banking regulatory framework and
business culture. Not all investor protection mechanisms are located in the corporate statutes,
as LLSV assumes. LLSV did not explore securities law rules, securities law structures, or banking
laws. As well, the Canadian system is both structured in such a way and has evolved in such a
way that investor protections are fairly consistent between the common law and civil law
provinces, even when the civil law statute does not necessarily mimic the common law statute.
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Legal Origins, Investor Protection, and Canada
Poonam Puri∗

I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning with their publication of Legal Determinants of External Finance,1 Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (“LLSV”) asked: “Why do some
countries have so much bigger capital markets than others?”2 According to them, the answer
lies in the legal environment of the country—its legal origin.3 LLSV conclude that because
common law countries have better investor protection mechanisms and better enforcement,
bigger capital markets are more achievable.4 They also find that the concentration of ownership
of shares in the largest public companies is negatively related to investor protection.5 Their
theories have led to a number of influential papers, either in agreement, or as a critique to their
work—collectively turning LLSV “into the most cited economists in the world over the past
decade.”6
While LLSV classified Canada as a common law jurisdiction in their studies, Canada actually
stands out as somewhat unique in the world financial markets as one of the few countries with
both common and civil law traditions. While the federal government and twelve of the thirteen
Associate Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University; Co‐Director, Hennick Centre for Business
and Law, York University; Director of Research and Policy, Capital Markets Institute, Rotman School of Business
(this paper is current as of October 2009). I would like to acknowledge the excellent research assistance of Anne
Ramsay, Jody Wong, Nitika Puri and Brandon Luft in the preparation of this Article. An earlier version of this paper
was presented at the “Evaluating Legal Origins Theory” Symposium at the J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham
Young University in 2009.
∗

1

Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997).

2

Id. at 1131.

3

Id. at 1149.

4

Id.

5

Id. at 1132.

6

Nicholas Thompson, Common Denominator, LEGAL AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2005, http://legalaffairs.org/issues/January‐
February‐2005/feature_thompson_janfeb05.msp.
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provinces and territories operate under the common law system, Quebec operates a civil law
system in its province within the larger Canadian common law framework. This fact makes
Canada an interesting jurisdiction for exploration of the LLSV theories, conclusions, and
critiques.
Canada’s capital markets are also different than the United States or the United Kingdom.
Canada is a small player in the world’s capital markets, with Canadian issuers representing only
3% of the world’s capital.7 Despite Canada being such a small player, the number of Canadian
public companies is relatively high compared to other countries, with about 4,000 issuers listed
on the TSX and TSX Venture Exchange.8 Canada also has a small number of very large issuers
and a large number of very small issuers. For example, the market capitalization of the 200
largest issuers listed on the TSX accounts for more than 88% of the total market capitalization
of all TSX and TSX Venture Exchange listed companies.9 Over 190 of Canada’s largest issuers are
also listed on major U.S. exchanges.10 In addition, a significant number of the largest non‐
financial public companies in Canada have controlling or major shareholders.11
Studies show that valuations of Canadian companies cross listed in the United States is higher
than those listed only in Canada.12 Studies also show that the cost of capital in Canada is
approximately twenty‐five basis points higher than in the United States.13 These differences in
valuation and cost of capital could be the result of differences in the quality of investor
protection between Canada and the United States. It is reasonable to attribute these
differences to investor concerns about Canada’s fragmented regulatory structure for securities,
concerns about ineffective enforcement vis‐a‐vis the United states, and concerns about the
significance of large number of controlling or major shareholders in Canada. These factors
suggest that context is important in the relative strengths of the capital market and investor
protection and that there is much more at play than can be found in examining the system of
laws.
7

Id.

8

The June 2009 statistics show 1,503 issuers listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (“TSX”) while 2,429 issues are
listed on the TSX Venture Exchange. See TMX GROUP INC., MARKET STATISTICS,
http://www.tmx.com/en/pdf/MarketStatistics_TMXGroup_Q22009.pdf.
9

NICHOLLS, supra note 8, at 133.

10

New York Stock Exchange, Listing Directory, http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/lc_all_region_1.html (last
visited Nov. 3, 2009); NASDAQ, Listed Companies, http://www.nasdaq.com/asp/NonUsOutput.asp?page=
C&previousCount=30&region=Northamerica (last visited Nov. 3, 2009).
11

NICHOLLS, supra note 8, at 134; see also Stephanie Ben‐Ishai & Poonam Puri, Dual Class Shares in Canada: A
Historical Analysis, 29 DALHOUSIE L.J. 117, 126–32 (2006).

12

Michael R. King & Dan Segal, Market Segmentation and Equity Valuation: Comparing Canada and the United
States, 18 J. INT’L. FIN. MARKETS, INST. & MONEY 245, 246 (2008).
13

Paul Halpren & Poonam Puri, ’Canada Steps Up’—Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada:
Recommendations and Discussion, 2 CAP. MARKETS L.J. 191, 191 (2007).
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Canada (and Quebec within Canada) provides an excellent context in which to explore the
nuances of the LLSV theories, conclusions and critiques on investor protection, capital markets
and legal families. Three issues are explored in this paper. The first issue is how and why
Canada fared relatively well (in contrast to the United States in particular) in the recent
financial crisis. The second issue is why Canada still has not created a national regulator for
securities, despite more than forty years of attempts to do so. The third issue explored in this
paper is how Quebec, as a civil law jurisdiction, operates within an overarching Canadian
common law framework and what are the cross‐fertilization implications of a civil law system
within a common law jurisdiction.
I explore these three issues by examining the development of various investor protection laws
and structures over time in Canada (as opposed to a point in time as the LLSV studies do), and
also by providing context which helps to explain why certain rules and structures have been
adapted and others, while economically efficient, may have been rejected. This exploration of
Canada highlights that context matters when looking at the laws related to investor protection
within a country. Not all investor protection mechanisms are located in the corporate statutes,
as LLSV assumes. LLSV did not explore securities law rules, securities law structures, or banking
laws. In Canada, as in many other jurisdictions, securities laws and securities structure have an
impact on investor protection and the debate on a common securities regulator has focused on
improving investor protection and improving enforcement. Furthermore, banking laws and the
banking framework play an important role in investor protection, in the broader sense. In
Canada, investor protection is reflected in the conservative nature of its banking system which
allowed Canadian financial institutions to escape relatively unscathed from the recent financial
crisis. Finally, the Canadian system is both structured in such a way and has evolved in such a
way that investor protections are fairly consistent between the common law and civil law
provinces, even when the civil law statute does not necessarily mimic the common law statute.
The unifying role of the Supreme Court of Canada and the unifying effect of various bodies such
as the Canadian Securities Administrators for provincial securities laws that work to ensure that
the laws and regulations are consistent across the country.
This paper proceeds as follows. Part II explores the details of the LLSV studies. Part III highlights
critiques of the LLSV studies and their conclusions. Part IV explores the case of Canada in
relation to investor protection and capital markets. It first explores how Canada faired during
the recent financial crisis. It then explores the debate over a national securities commission.
Finally, it considers the position of Quebec, as the only civil law province, within Canada, and
how investor protections have remained relatively harmonized between legal families. Part V
concludes.

II. WHAT DOES LLSV SAY?
This part of the paper summarizes the findings and contentions of LLSV noted at the beginning
of this article.14 In their well‐known 1998 paper Law and Finance,15 LLSV looked at laws
14

See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.

15

Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998).
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pertaining to investor protection. Their goal was to “establish whether laws pertaining to
investor protection differ across countries and whether these differences have consequences
for corporate finance.”16 In order to reach their goal, they distinguished between common
families of law within civil law (French, German, and Scandinavian), and those within common
law (British colonies, United States, Canada, Australia, and India), using a sample of 49
countries.17 While they acknowledge that legal scholars often disagree upon the definition of a
“legal family,” they based their research on the approach used by scholars that enabled the
identification of civil law and common law traditions.18 Furthermore, to classify countries into
legal families, LLSV relied on the works of Reynolds and Flores.19
The measurement of investor protection was done by looking at shareholder rights, anti‐
director rights, and creditor protection rights.20 Some of the criteria they used for coding
shareholder and anti‐director rights were: one share‐one vote, proxy by mail allowed, shares
not blocked before meeting, cumulative voting, oppressed minority, pre‐emptive right to new
issues, and percentage of share capital to call extraordinary shareholder meeting. 21 In terms of
creditor protection rights, LLSV scored countries in both reorganization and liquidation. 22
Based on a regression analysis, they concluded that common law countries tend to afford more
protection to their investors than do civil law countries, while French civil law countries offer
the weakest protection.23 They also noted that the ranking is roughly the same for both
shareholder protection and creditor protection, meaning “[i]t is not the case that some legal
families protect shareholders and others protect creditors.”24
With these findings in mind, LLSV further posed the question of whether countries with poor
investor protection compensate in other ways, such as having quality law enforcement.25 To
evaluate the quality of law enforcement, LLSV used five criteria: efficiency of judicial system,
rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation, and likelihood of contract repudiation by the
government.26 From their data, LLSV answer their question in the negative.27 They ultimately
16

Id. at 1121.

17

Id. at 1115–16.

18

Id. at 1117–19.

19

Id. at 1119 (citing THOMAS REYNOLDS & ARTURO FLORES, FOREIGN LAW: CURRENT SOURCES OF BASIC LEGISLATION IN
JURISDICTIONS OF THE WORLD (1989)).
20

Id. at 1127–28, 1134.

21

Id. at 1122–25 (listing the variables used in the study).

22

Id. at 1134.

23

Id. at 1129.

24

Id. at 1139.

25

Id. at 1139–40.

26

Id. at 1140.
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conclude that law enforcement is stronger in common law countries, and weakest in the French
civil law countries.28 But while quality of law enforcement does not compensate for the quality
of laws, countries tend to develop substitute mechanisms, like ownership concentration, for
poor investment protection.29
However, do countries with poor investor protection actually suffer? While LLSV had no
definitive answer to this question, they do suggest a positive association between the legal
system and economic development.30 In subsequent research, LLSV attempted to expand on
their findings. In 1999, they set out to study the effect of protections on valuation and found
that countries with better shareholder protection are associated with a higher valuation of
corporate assets.31
The Legal Origins Theory debate continues and has led to a surge of publications on this subject
matter. While LLSV have paved the way with their arguments and findings, they have garnered
a lot of support and criticism at the same time. But ultimately, the discussions and debates will
further our understanding of the differences in investor protection and market outcomes
around the world.

III. CRITIQUES OF LLSV
The LLSV legal origins theory has been critiqued in several ways including: A. methodology, B.
coding and variables, C. context, and D. other explanations.

A. METHODOLOGY
The methodology that LLSV employ in their studies is one of the more obvious criticisms. The
problem with using regression analysis as a main tool is simply the fact that correlation does
not equal causation, and that correlation can be misleading. For example, while no law in the
United States or United Kingdomrequires board of directors to be independent of
management, correlation makes it seem like legal rules “caused” this independence because it
is the norm in both these countries.32 Law in general is hard to quantify, and thus, some
27

Id. at 1141.

28

Id.

29

Id. at 1141 and 1145.

30

Id. at 1153.

31

Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. Fin. 1147, 1166–69 (2002)..

32

John C. Coffee, Jr., Do Norms Matter? A Cross‐Country Examination of the Private Benefits of Control 6–7 (Colum.
L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 183, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=257613).
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speculate on the usefulness of such quantitative studies.33 In his 2005 paper, Siems reviewed
the use of numerical comparisons of laws and found both arguments for and against the use of
numerical comparisons. The critiques include the argument that numerical comparisons
oversimplify the complex legal systems that exist where historical context and institutional
dimensions play an important role,34 as discussed further below. Furthermore, law is
extraordinary by the dynamic nature of the law‐and‐society systems, including extra‐
jurisdictional complexities, which need to be considered when studying the impact of laws.35
Laws are prescriptive and reactive and are more about values then they are quantifiable.36
Finally, the focus of legal rules, especially in the context of comparative law, should be on the
functionality of laws rather than the legal similarities and differences.37 LLSV’s focus on whether
a rule exists or does not exist in various countries ignores the possibility of other legal solutions
which achieve the same result, but in a different manner.38 The legal context of laws within the
social fabric of a country is a critical element of comparative law that cannot be established by
applying simplifying numerical comparisons of law between countries, although it may apply to
a comparison of laws within the same country.39
While there is criticism of the use of numerical comparisons in legal research, the LLSV theories
could be seen as a way to reduce the complicated endeavour of comparative law into
something that is more understandable and therefore useable.40 There are also arguments that
law is no more extraordinary than any other social science, such as economics or political
science, and yet these sciences are able to use statistics to analyze data to some degree of
success.41 Finally, since the study of comparative law is relatively new, especially in terms of
methodology, there are no set rules on how to conduct these types of studies.42
In addition, it is argued that the categorization of law seems arbitrary and the distinction
between common and civil law is not useful in terms of a law‐and‐finance analysis.43 As a result,
some have suggested a more precise criteria consisting of four identifiers: European
33

Mathias M. Siems, Numerical Comparative Law: Do We Need Statistical Evidence in Law in Order to Reduce
Complexity?, 13 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 521 (2005).
34

Id. at 529.

35

Id.

36

Id. at 530.

37

Id. at 531.

38

Id. at 532.

39

Id. at 531, 533.

40

Id. at 534.

41

Id. at 535.

42

Id. at 537.

43

See Mathias M. Siems, Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & Finance and Comparative Law, 52 MCGILL L.J. 55 (2007).

2009]

LEGAL ORIGINS, INVESTOR PROTECTION, AND CANADA

9

colonization (colonizing power), language, relative importance of statutory law and courts, and
formality/flexibility of a legal system.44 Clear criteria are necessary in order to categorize law,
otherwise it may result in measurement errors and biased coefficients.45

B. LLSV CODING AND VARIABLES
Besides concerns with methodological tools, the LLSV coding may also be questionable.46 One
specific example is that it may be misleading to code the components of investor protection in
a binary manner as being satisfactory or not satisfactory since it is often in the middle.47
Spamann has argued that there is inconsistent treatment in the coding, and when he corrected
the values of the “Antidirector Rights Index,” he obtained data showing that the findings of
LLSV did not hold—there was no difference between common and civil law jurisdictions.48
Apart from this coding inconsistency, other variables are inconsistently coded or used as well.49
For example, whereas a “mandatory dividend” variable appears on the LLSV 1998 study,50 it is
left out in the LLSV 2000 study.51 LLSV 1998 also did not differentiate between default and
mandatory legal rules.52 Furthermore, many of the shareholder protection variables have not
been theoretically or empirically determined, the number of variables used to measure the
legal frameworks is insufficient, and there may be bias in the variables chosen because they are
derived from common law.53
In reconsidering LLSV’s shareholder protection measures for Austria and the United Kingdom,
44

Id. at 70–73.

45

Id. at 70.

46

See Stefan Voigt, Are International Merchants Stupid? Their Choice of Law Sheds Doubt on the Legal Origin
Theory, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2008).
47

Caspar Rose, The Challenges of Quantifying Investor Protection in a Comparative Context, 8 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV.
369, 384–85 (2007).
48

Holger Spamann, ’Law and Finance’ Revisited 16–17 (Harvard Law School John M. Olin Ctr., Discussion Paper No.
12, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=1095526.
49

Id. at 7.

50

La Porta et al., supra note 18, at 1123.

51

La Porta et al., supra note 34 at 1156–57.

52

Rose, supra note 51 at 391. To their credit, this aspect was later incorporated by expanding the variable
descriptions. Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self‐Dealing (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 11883, 2005).
53

Robert Schmidbauer, On the Fallacy of LLSV Revisited—Further Evidence About Shareholder Protection in
Austria and the United Kingdom 10 (Feb. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=913968.
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Schmidbauer compiled his own shareholder protection score for the index, and concluded that
law is not the main link—it only plays an assisting role.54 Perhaps one of the more important
limitations is that the indices that LLSV create only provide us with a cross‐sectional view of the
law at a point in time.55 When legal rules are coded as they have evolved over time, including
norms derived from takeover codes and corporate governance codes,56 the differences
between civil and common law jurisdictions converge over time.57 Further, while using this new
index,58 there was no link between shareholder protection and stock market development. This
suggests that perhaps strength of shareholder protection may not matter for financial
development.59

C. CONTEXT
The critiques related to methodology lead into a discussion of context. LLSV have been
criticized for focusing largely on legal families and very little on the way by which the law has
developed within the specific country.60 The context in which laws are developed is important.
The history of a country matters when looking at how laws are developed, as it may help to
explain why there are similarities and differences between jurisdictions. In addition, the
political economy and the social and cultural circumstances of a country are important to
demonstrate that although the laws may be different, the effect may be similar in terms of
investor protection. This may be especially true when countries are at different stages of
development, as the law then must deal with different social problems, not just investor
protection.61
In a similar manner, Pistor proposed that the process in which legal change occurs is crucial for
the development of effective law.62 She argues that “for law to be effective, it must become
part of the institutional fabric of a society, contributing to the process of institutional
54

Id. at 44.

55

John Armour et al.,Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development: An Empirical Test of the Legal Origins
Hypothesis 11 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 108, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1094355.
56

Id. at 12.

57

See id. at 37–39.

58

Id. at 32–35.

59

Id.

60

See Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean‐Francois Richard, Economic Development, Legality, and the
Transplant Effect 16 (William Davidson, Working Paper No. 410, 2001), available at
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/39794.
61
62

Siems, supra note 24, at 532.

Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp & Mark D. West, Evolution of Corporate Law and the
Transplant Effect: Lessons from Six Countries, WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER, Spring 2003, at 89, 90.
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innovation and change.”63 Formalizing laws on the books is not sufficient, rather it is “[o]nly
when the law is used—when it is modified in response to changing demands or socioeconomic
conditions.” that the law truly becomes operationalized.64 In essence, the “success of a legal
system is not determined by having miraculously enacted good law at the outset but by
developing the capacity to continuously find solutions to new problems.”65
There is also debate as to whether laws can be successfully transplanted to other jurisdictions,
given the specific context in which the laws were first developed. Armour et al. suggested that
laws derived from corporate governance standards considered to be international best practice
do not work well when transplanted into contexts removed from those of the systems in which
they originated.66 It was suggested that while investor protections relating to independent
board members and the mandatory bid rule, which both originated in the common law, “may
be wellfitted to a dispersed ownership regime, they may work less well in systems with
concentrated ownership.”67 The view was that “[i]ndependent directors do little to . . .
[improve] majority‐minority agency costs where they are appointed by the majority
shareholder; similarly, the mandatory bid rule can, in this context, make it more difficult for
acquirers to purchase a company, by forcing the bidder to share the control premium with
minority shareholders.”68

D. OTHER EXPLANATIONS
The last category of critiques in regards to LLSV’s studies concerns the view that legal origins
cannot be the only explanation for investor protection in capital market development. It is
possible that norms also play a factor in this equation.69 Legal rules are rooted in an
environment where norms and conventional practices play an important role in the
development, implementation, and enforcement of laws.70 The common law versus civil law
argument advanced by some commentators oversimplifies this complex development.71
Instead, perhaps non‐legally enforceable social norms, social cohesion, and signals72 can show
that norms do matter. In fact, they matter the most as a practical substitution for law when law
63

Id at 90.

64

Id.

65

Id.

66

Armour, supra note 46, at 40.

67

Id.

68

Id.

69

Coffee, supra note 23.

70

Id.

71

Id. at 11–12.

72

Id. at 24.
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is the weakest.73 For example, signals about a corporation’s intentions become extremely
important when the law and norms about shareholder rights are weak.74
Another interesting perspective in the legal origins debate is through the lens of international
transactions. In such transactions, businesspeople have a choice as to where they want to
conduct the transaction: under common law or civil law.75 Voigt’s study revealed that in
structuring their transactions, businesspeople chose American law less frequently than
expected, while choosing French and Swiss law more frequently than expected.76 This seems
contrary to LLSV’s contentions because according to them, if common law more effectively
protected transactions, it should have been more frequently chosen by businesspeople.77

IV. INVESTOR PROTECTION AND THE CANADIAN CAPITAL MARKETS
A. CANADA’S BANKING SYSTEM AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
Throughout the recent credit and financial crisis, the Canadian banking system has managed to
maintain a level of profitability, liquidity, and financial stability not seen in other jurisdictions.
The Canadian banking system has recently been regarded by the IMF as a paragon of
international best practices.78 The World Economic Forum also recently ranked it the soundest
in the world.79 While financial institutions around the world have collapsed or survived on
government bailouts, Canadian banks have had access to a more modest mortgage purchase
program. Moreover, as of early 2009, the banks have no longer needed it.80 Canadian banks are
well capitalized and more conservative than banks in many other jurisdictions of the world.81
How and why did Canada fare better than other jurisdictions? This Article offers three related
explanations. First, as discussed below, Canada had developed more conservative banking laws
73

Id. at 29.

74

Id. at 29–30.

75

Voigt, supra note 37.

76

Id. at 16.

77

Id. at 17.

78

Pietro S. Nivola & John C. Courtney, Know Thy Neighbor: What Canada Can Tell Us About Financial Regulation,
THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, April 23, 2009.
79

Michael E. Porter & Klaus Schwab, The Global Competitiveness Report 2008‐2009, WORLD ECON. FORUM, 2008, at
129.
80

Id.

81

Id.
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than other jurisdictions, which no doubt played a part in the relative survival of its financial
sector. This explanation is consistent with a generalized version of LLSV’s thesis that law
matters (noting however that LLSV do not explore legal rules in banking when exploring
investor protection, instead focusing only on corporate law rules). However, legal rules offer
only a partial explanation.
A second and contributing factor is legal structures. The performance of Canadian banks during
the economic crisis and recession is due in part to the manner in which these banks are
regulated as well as the legal rules themselves. The design of the regulatory bodies that oversee
banking appears to play a part in Canada’s relative survival. This idea is evidenced by the fact
that countries such as the United States are attempting to transplant Canadian structures such
as the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada into their own regulatory framework for
banking.82 LLSV did not consider the impact of regulatory design and structure on investor
protection, whereas I argue in this paper that it is an important component.
A third factor at play is culture and norms. A more conservative culture in the Canadian banking
industry certainly had an impact on the amount and type of risk taken on by banks, allowing
them to avoid the extent of losses of their competitors in other jurisdictions.
1. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CONSERVATISM IN THE CANADIAN BANKING SYSTEM
The historical context of Canada’s banking system has played an important role in the
development of the current regulatory system, the particular legal rules, and the relatively
conservative culture of Canadian bank management. A historical analysis of Canada’s banking
system reveals a trend of major banking failures that pushed Canada into a conservative
approach towards banking, including heavy regulation and strict government oversight. Banking
in Canada is centralized at the federal level and there is no provincial equivalent in Canada to
the U.S. state chartered banks.83
Banking in Canada formally started in Canada when the British government granted a charter
that created the Bank of Montreal in 1817, subsequently granting additional charters to other
banks. The Constitution Act, 1867 subsequently gave the federal government legislative
authority to deal with all issues related to “Banking, Incorporation of Banks, and the Issue of
Paper Money”.84 However, Canada continued to have a decentralized banking system until the
early 1900’s with the provinces being able to issue paper money. It was in these years that
Canadians learned the vulnerabilities and dangers of independent, autonomous banks and the
need to develop a system of sufficient government oversight and regulation to govern Canada’s
banking system.
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House Panel Set to Start Work on Consumer‐Finance Agency, WALL ST. J., September 30, 2009, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125432239442852629.html
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Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5 (Appendix 1985).
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Several large bank failures in the 1920’s, including the Merchants Bank of Canada and the
Home Bank of Canada, highlighted to the government that some sort of regulatory oversight
was required to protect the banks’ stakeholders. In both the cases above, practically no warning
was provided to stakeholders, depositors and investors that a failure was imminent.85 Not only
did the collapse of major banks create a discussion of the government’s role in the operations
of chartered banks, but specific provisions were being established in order to prevent further
stakeholder destruction and ensure stability of Canadian banks.86 In 1933, a Royal
Commission87 was established to study the Canadian banking system and determine whether a
central banking institution was needed.88 The Commission recommended in favor of a central
bank and offered specific suggestions that were incorporated into the Bank of Canada Act
(“BOC Act”),89 and the Bank of Canada was created in 1935 as a private bank.90 In 1938 the BOC
Act was amended and the Bank of Canada became nationalized.91
One important aspect of the BOC Act is the deferral of standard setting of key bank
requirements to the “Office of the Superintendent” (“OSFI”). OSFI currently plays a role as one
of six regulatory oversight bodies92 that regulate aspects of the banking system and acts as the
main banking regulator. OSFI’s mandate partially explains the reasons for Canada’s sound
banking system. It states that OSFI was created to contribute to public confidence in the
Canadian financial system by “supervising institutions and pension plans to determine whether
they are in sound financial condition . . . and are complying with their governing law and
supervisory requirements.”93 OSFI has traditionally and consistently set Canadian bank
requirements higher than those set out or recommended by other major economic powers,
including Basel II;he most relevant example of this is the capital adequacy guidelines required
85

History, BANK OF CANADA, 2009, http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/about/history.html.

86

Id.
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Proceedings of the Royal Commission on Banking and Currency, Canada, Ottawa, ROYAL COMMISSION ON BANKING

AND CURRENCY (1933),available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/9626270/Royal‐Commission‐on‐Banking‐and‐

Currency‐1933‐CANADA‐Proceedings‐Vol‐1‐to‐6‐Highlights.
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History, BANK OF CANADA, supra note 89. . See generally James L. Darroch & Charles J. McMillan, Entry Barriers and
Evolutions of Banking Systems: Lessons from the 1980s Canadian Western Bank Failures, 50 CANADIAN PUB. ADMIN.
141, 141–66 (2007); M.H. OGILVIE, BANK AND CUSTOMER LAW IN CANADA (Irwin Law 2007).
89

Bank of Canada Act, R.S.C., ch. B 2 (1985).

90

Supra note 76.

91

Id.

92

The Department of Finance, the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Bank of Canada, the Financial
Consumer Agency, and the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institution set standards, coordinate the
overall regulatory structure, and enforce it with sanctions. The Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC)
plays a dominant role in shaping mortgage default‐insurance policy.
93

Our Mandate, OFFICE OF SUPERINTENDENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CANADA, Mar. 3, 2007, http://www.osfi‐
bsif.gc.ca/osfi/index_e.aspx?DetailID=2.

2009]

LEGAL ORIGINS, INVESTOR PROTECTION, AND CANADA

15

for Canadian banks.94
2. LEGAL RULES AND IMPLEMENTATION GOVERNING THE CANADIAN BANKING SYSTEM
An important aspect of banking stability is the ability of banks to manage their capital during
economic downturns. One area that OSFI regulations have protected the stability of banks in
the face of economic downturn is the Tier 1 capital requirement95 placed on Canadian banking
institutions. OSFI has set out a minimum requirement on Canadian financial institutions to carry
a Tier 1 capital ratio of 7% and an overall capital ratio of 10%.96 As a comparison, the 2004 Basel
II Accord, which sets out international recommendations for banking regulations, set minimum
requirements of 4% Tier 1 capital ratio and 8% total capital ratio.97 The United States have a
Tier 1 capital requirement of 6% and a total capital requirement of 10% while the United
Kingdom followed the Basel II requirements of 4% and 8% respectively.98 After reflecting on the
toxic assets that doomed many of the major institutions in the United States during the crisis
and recession, it becomes even clearer why strict and effective capital requirements are so
important for financial institutions.
Stricter legal rules in Canada for mortgage loans may have also had an impact. In Canada both
OSFI and the CMHC exercise prudential oversight and influence over mortgage underwriting.
Mortgage lending in Canada tends to happen in the banking system and relies less on the
securitization of loans as is more typical in the United States.99 Moreover, the United States has
a substantially larger sub‐prime market at 13% of current outstanding mortgage credit, while
Canada has less than 3%.100
This is not to overemphasize the role of legal rules. Historically, in both Canada and the United
94

Bank Act, 1991 S.C., ch. 46 (Can.).
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Consultative Paper on the New Basel II Framework, OFF. OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF FIN. INSTITUTIONS 40 (2004).
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Guideline – Capital Adequacy Requirements, OFF. OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF FIN. INSTITUTIONS, (2007),
http://www.osfi‐bsif.gc.ca/app/DocRepository/1/eng/guidelines/capital/ guidelines/CAR_A1_e.pdf.
Capital
requirements are crucial in OSFI’s “Assets to Capital Multiple” test, which is placed on all financial institutions. OSFI
requires that this ratio does not exceed 20,meaning that an institution’s total assets can be more than 20 times
greater than the sum of its tier 1 and tier 2 capital. Since this type of capital is strictly calculated, it ensures that an
institution will always have an adequate degree of permanent capital in relation to its total assets. Therefore, even
if a number of assets are written down or written off, the institution will still have an adequate level of
“permanent capital” to ensure that it remains financially stable.
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http://www.desjardins.com/en/a_propos/etudes_economiques/actualites/point_
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States, the four separate pillars of the financial system—banking, trust companies, insurers, and
securities dealers—have not been allowed to operate within one organization.101 Both Canada
and the United States changed their rules in the 1980s and 1990s allowing banks to acquire
investment dealers but with different results.102 In the 1980s, Canada allowed commercial
banks to acquire and own investment dealers. Accordingly, each of the five Canadian banks
acquired a major dealer as a subsidiary that then became subject to the regulatory framework
governing commercial banks in Canada. Independent dealers still remain in Canada but the
major players have been absorbed by the commercial banks. By contrast, when the four pillars
were dismantled in the United States, some of the largest investment dealers stayed
independent—Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns to name two—and continued to be subject
only to oversight by the SEC, not by the U.S. Federal Reserve as a commercial bank. As a result
of the bailouts, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs agreed to become chartered as bank
holding companies, and are therefore under tighter supervision by the U.S. Federal Reserve.103
Thus, despite the same legal rules permitting similar industry structures, the nature of the of
the Canadian commercial and investment banking industry had a different risk profile than that
in the United States.
3. CULTURE OF OPERATIONAL CAUTION IN THE CANADIAN BANKING SYSTEM
A more conservative culture is also a contributing factor. While Canadian laws are more
conservative than international standards, Canadian banks tend to be even more conservative
than the OSFI regulations. While OSFI set out a minimum Tier 1 capital requirement of 7%,
Canadian banks have been at 9.8%, several percentage points above the regulatory
requirement.104 This is in contrast to the average capital ratio for United States investment
banks which was at 4% and for European commercial banks which was at 3.3%.105
On the one hand, the analysis of Canadian banks and the financial crisis appears to support
LLSV. Canada’s more conservative Tier 1 capital requirements and asset to capital multiple, in
comparison to international standards (and its U.S. neighbor), has played an important part in
Canada’s banks avoiding the extent of the financial crisis in the United States.
On the other hand, this brief discussion also highlights that context, norms, and culture also
play a critical role. Even though the laws set certain caps or ratios on the banks’ capital, most
Canadian banks maintained a less risky capital ratio than required by the law, reasonably
101

The Canadian Financial Services Sector, DEP’T OF FIN. CANADA (2005), http://www.fin.gc.ca/toc/2005/fact‐cfss‐
eng.asp.
102
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Bid to Ride Out Crisis, WALL ST. J., September 22, 2008, available at
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reflecting a more conservative nature as a product of the development of its banking system.
This is not to say that all Canadian banks were or are equally conservative or that they will
necessarily remain so. As some of Canada’s larger banks expand internationally, some have
been more exposed to the United States credit crisis, resulting in large write offs of bad
mortgages or lending to high risk entities that have failed.106 In gaining exposure to foreign
markets where the culture is not so conservative, one can only question to what degree their
conservative nature will transplant to these new environments and vice versa.

B. WHY DOES CANADA NOT YET HAVE A NATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATOR?
While the rest of the world is discussing the merits of a common or integrated financial
regulator in the wake of the financial crisis107, Canada continues with its long standing debate
over a single Canadian securities regulator. Canada has thirteen provincial and territorial
securities regulators, each with its own securities act, fees, and processes. Historically, public
companies that wished to raise money across Canada had to file with each securities regulator
and pay the associated fees; similarly, intermediaries carrying on business across Canada had to
register with multiple commissions across the country.108
The debate over a common securities regulator has persisted over 40 years with little success in
achieving agreement on its creation.109 A common sentiment throughout all attempts at
106

Duncan Mavin, CIBC's Writedown Woes Not Over, Say Analysts, FIN. POST, June 23, 2008, available at
http://www.financialpost.com/story.html?id=608460.
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See generally John C. Coffee & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95
VA. L. REV. 707, 2009).
108

There have been significant strides made to harmonize securities regulation across Canada. Since the 1990s
there has been harmonization of rules through the Canadian Securities Administrators and the creation of National
Instruments which sets out common regulations. In addition, there is now a passport system to streamline
administrative processing of prospectuses and applications and in 2009 a national registration system was created.
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The calls for a national securities regulator began in earnest in 1964 when the Royal Commission on Banking
and Finance recommended that the federal government establish a single federal agency which would take over
the major responsibility for securities regulation from the provinces. Although this initiative failed, it did result in
more interprovincial cooperation. In 1979, the federal government published Proposals for a Securities Market Law
for Canada, which also proposed a single securities commission for Canada to regulate international and
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periodic negotiations and an agreement was drafted, the federal government dropped the initiative due to
opposition in Québec and the western provinces. In December 2003, the federally commissioned Wise Persons’
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came of it. In June 2006, the Ontario‐appointed Crawford Panel released a Blueprint for a Canadian Securities
Commission where the call was once again for a model for a “common securities regulator” for Canada, operating
under common legislation. The most recent attempt at building support for a national securities regulator was the
January 2009 report by the Expert Panel on Securities Regulation. The Expert Panel again recommended a
Canadian Securities Commission and even presented a draft securities act.
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reforming Canada’s securities regulatory system has been that the current system, as presently
operated, is inadequate to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow. While the system is not
broken in the sense of regulatory oversight, it must be improved significantly in order for
Canada to remain competitive in attracting capital.110 The international community has also
waded into the debate. The IMF has repeatedly indicated that Canada needs a single securities
regulator.111 A Canadian securities regulator is currently one of the issues on the table for the
proposed Canada‐EU trade deal.112
In this part of the paper, I argue that securities regulatory structure matters for investor
protection. LLSV, however, do not take into account regulatory structure (or securities law rules
for that matter). Rather, they focus on legal rules and specifically, only corporate law rules.
While corporate law is not unimportant, it is based on a system of self‐regulation, where
market actors must pursue litigation in the courts themselves. While corporate law remains an
important framework of protection of investors in private companies, securities laws are a
primary source of investor protections for public companies in Canada and in many other
jurisdictions.113 Similarly, while courts are important (a factor that LLSV take into account),
securities regulators’ actions are arguably even more important in certain instances in ensuring
investor protection.114
I also argue in this part of the paper that context is critical in the debate on a national securities
regulator and that political, economic, and historic circumstances constrain the choices and
decisions that are possible. Most reasonable people would agree that if Canada were starting
from scratch in designing a regulator for securities matters, it would create a single regulator
for the entire country; however, the provinces having occupied this space for so long and
Quebec having a special place in Canada result in a tremendous obstacle to the possibility of a
federal or single structure. A related point is that in the absence of a change in formal legal
structures in Canada, there have been reasonable attempts at functional changes, by way of
harmonizing laws and streamlining processes to create, for example, the Passport system.115
110
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One of the principle debates over a common securities regulator relates to the question of
whose jurisdiction does securities regulation fall within: the federal government or the
provinces? In Canada, the supervision of the securities industry was not explicitly given to
either the provincial or federal levels of government within the Constitution Act, 1867. Over the
years, as the capital markets have grown, the provinces and territories have begun to regulate
securities under the “property and civil rights” clause of the Constitution Act, 1867,116 which
has resulted in each province and territory having its own securities regulator. 117 While there
have been expert opinions118 indicating that the federal government could assert jurisdiction
over capital markets, possibly pursuant to its power to legislate in respect of the “regulation of
trade,”119 the federal government has always been reluctant to use this jurisdiction. To date,
the jurisdiction of the federal government to override provincial securities law has never been
tested in a court.120
While the current system of multiple regulators has strengths, including a local presence,
development of industry expertise, responsiveness to distinct local and regional issues and
innovation, there are a number of weaknesses.121 The weaknesses include enforcement, or lack
thereof, inefficient allocation of resources, coordination difficulties, and inconsistent priorities
within investor protection, and policy development. There are also costs associated with 13
securities regulators, including duplication of costs, cost of compliance, time delays,
opportunity costs, and the perception in the international community of a fragmented
regulatory system. 122
Enforcement of securities law is considered weak as compared to other jurisdictions, somewhat
as a result of the fragmented system of securities regulation.123 In the Task Force to Modernize
jurisdictions. The Passport System replaces the principal regulator and mutual reliance review system for
prospectuses and for certain exemptive relief applications. See Ward Sellers & Daniel Yelin, Canadian Securities
Regulators Implement Next Phase of Passport System, available at
http://www.osler.com/expertise_mergers.aspx?id=14604. The national registration system, which creates a new
Canada‐wide registration regime, came into effect on September 28, 2009.
116
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Securities Regulation, Bhattacharya found that the enforcement of securities laws reduces the
cost of capital, which in turn increases liquidity in the capital markets and, as measured against
the United States, enforcement of securities laws is weak in Canada.124
The inefficient allocation or lack of resources is another criticism of the current structure, as
each province and territory has a securities commission with similar mandates.125 However,
with the exception of Ontario, jurisdictions do not typically have sufficient resources to perform
all the tasks of oversight, policy development, and enforcement.126 This leads to coordination
difficulties between provinces and territories in terms of timing and priorities. Priorities among
provincial or territorial securities commissions may differ, often on political grounds, in terms of
investor protections and policy development.
Issuers and intermediaries also criticize the costs associated with complying with the
requirements of thirteen securities regulators. While public companies pay fees to each
jurisdiction, fees are in some cases paid to the provincial government, not directly to the
securities commission for their use. The costs of complying with thirteen different securities
acts or legislation, while significantly harmonized, are nonetheless imposed on public
companies.
On the international front, Canada is not represented at the International Organization of
Securities Commissions, but rather two of Canada’s largest provinces, Ontario and Quebec, sit
as members.127 The inability for Canada to have a single, consistent voice on the international
stage has the potential to create problems in terms of implementing effective change to
Canada’s capital markets.
Despite the numerous studies, commissions, and panels that have been organized, the lack of
political will of the federal government to move to a national regulator exists for several
reasons. First, while not necessarily efficient or cost effective, the thirteen provincial and
territorial securities commissions have taken a number of steps to harmonize their regulations
and streamline their processes, which some will argue gets Canada functionally to the same
point without a constitutional challenge.128 Secondly, similar to other issues that have a
constitutional jurisdictional element to them, the proposals for a national securities regulator
Market: The Impact of Enforcement, (2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=80028#show 967482.
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have not historically garnered much support from the provinces, with the exception of
Ontario.129 Quebec and Alberta have constantly expressed their disagreement with this strategy
and have recently indicated that they will bring a court challenge to prevent a national
securities regulator..130 While British Columbia has previously been opposed to a national
regulator, its position has recently shifted. 131Third, the political will to create a national
securities regulator has historically not been strong. The recent financial crisis and a number of
high profile fraud cases are some of the major events that have spurred the federal
government to move forward with a solid proposal for a national securities regulator.
The Federal government recently announced a Transition Team and gave it a budget of $150
million to negotiate with the provinces to establish a common securities regulator, based on
the report and recommendations of the Expert Panel on Securities Regulation.132 Needless to
say, political, economic and cultural influences have played a role in the development of
securities structure, and functional forms will have an impact on the negotiations and the
model that is ultimately adopted. The Transition Team is currently working on draft legislation
and expects that a national securities regulator will be running by 2012.133 .
The case of Canada highlights why regulatory structure matters when it comes to investor
protection—corporate law cannot be considered in isolation without considering securities law.
In addition, context plays an important role when considering the impact of the regulatory
structure on investor protection as the historical, political and economic circumstances all play
a part in whether an effective investor protection regime has been created.

C. QUEBEC ‐ A CIVIL LAW PROVINCE WITHIN A COMMON LAW COUNTRY
Canada is somewhat unique in that both common law and civil law operate within the same
country. The federal government and the provinces, other than Quebec, follow the common
law. Mixed legal systems are also found in Louisiana, Scotland, St. Lucia, Puerto Rico, South
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Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka.134
Civil law, which is based on a written “civil code,” covers only matters of private law including:
the legal attributes of a person, the relationship between individuals, property, and the legal
institutions governing or administering these relationships. Civil codes are intended to be easy
to understand and apply to facts through the specific nature of each regulation. It does not rely
on precedent (or principles) to the same extent as common law.135
LLSV suggest that civil law jurisdictions provide investors weaker legal protection than common
law jurisdictions.136 LLSV also suggest that common law countries give shareholders and
creditors the strongest protection while French civil law countries provide the weakest
protection.137 But they did not address the situation where a country has both common law and
civil law systems. The LLSV 1998 study categorized Canada as a common law country, with the
result that Canada was considered average for shareholder protection138 among common law
countries, low for creditor protection,139 and high for enforcement of the laws.140 This part of
the paper compares shareholder remedies and rights in the Quebec provincial corporate law
statute with the federal business corporations act and finds that several important statutory
remedies that are found in the federal corporate law statute are absent—by historical choice—
from the Quebec statute. Nonetheless, Quebec courts have developed judicial versions of the
derivative action and oppression action.
In Canada, the Constitution Act, 1867, gives the federal and provincial governments similar
legislative authority over business incorporation. Each government, federal and
provincial/territorial,has its own incorporation statutes. During the 1970’s, the corporate
legislative framework in Canada underwent significant reform inspired by the
recommendations published in the Dickerson Report.141 The purposes of this reform were
threefold. First, it attempted to offer a more pragmatic approach in regard to the mechanics,
operations and incorporation of companies. Second, it introduced a contractual approach with
134

William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law vs. Civil Law (Codified and Uncodified) (Part I), 4 UNIF. L. REV.
591, 592–93 (1999); William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law vs. Civil Law (Codified and Uncodified) (Part
II), 4 UNIF. L. REV. 877 (1999).
135

See, JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY & RODERICK A. MACDONALD, QUÉBEC CIVIL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO QUÉBEC PRIVATE LAW (PINCITE

NEEDED) (1993); Canadian Bar Association ‐ Ontario, et al., The New Civil Code: A Practical Guide to What Every

Ontario Lawyer Needs to Know about Québec Law (Ottawa: CBAO, 1994); Pearl Eliadis, The Legal System in Quebec,
in GERALD GALL, THE CANADIAN LEGAL SYSTEM, 263–84 (5th ed. 2004).
136

Rafael La Porta et al., Law & Finance, supra note 18, at 1116.

137

Id.

138

Id. at 1130.

139

Id. at 1136.

140

Id at 1142.

141

Margaret Smith, Canada Business Corporations Act: Directors’ Residency Requirements and Other Residency
Issues, at 2, available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb9931‐e.pdf.

2009]

LEGAL ORIGINS, INVESTOR PROTECTION, AND CANADA

23

respect to how relations between internal actors of the corporation were to be governed.
Finally, it offered a protective dimension to the interests and rights of shareholders.
These aspects of the reform initiative were adopted in the Canada Business Corporations Act142
(“CBCA”) that was enacted in 1975. Following the federal initiative, provinces responded by
either enacting amendments to their respective corporate legislation or by opting to proceed
with a reform inspired by the federal model. Quebec opted for the former by integrating Part IA
to the Quebec Companies Act (“QCA”).143 However, the Quebec legislature did not strictly
follow the Dickerson recommendations but rather chose to refrain from adopting a shareholder
protection regime similar to the one found under the federal regulation. As a result, the QCA
contains certain provisions designed to protect shareholders but falls short of offering similar
remedies found in its federal counterpart, the CBCA. Consequently, litigants in Quebec have to
refer to judicially created recourses found under the Civil Code of Quebec144 (“CCQ”) and the
Code of Civil Procedure145 (“CCPC”) in order to fill the gap. However, the judicially created
recourses lack the flexibility and clarity usually associated with those found under the CBCA.
In considering investor protection within Canada, it is necessary to consider the distinctions
between the CBCA and the QCA statutes. Specific areas of corporate law that are of interest
when comparing the QCA and the CBCA are shareholder protection and remedies.
While the QCA has specific preventive measures relating to shareholder protection, it contains
no explicit provision giving rise to a derivative action, an oppression remedy, or a recourse
seeking a restraining and compliance order. In addition, the QCA does not offer the possibility
for shareholders to exercise their right to dissent in the event a significant change similar to the
ones listed in section 190(1) CBCA occurs. Nonetheless, the Quebec law still provides certain
powers of control and supervision to the courts in order to attempt to remedy this gap.
Unlike the specific statutory provisions of the CBCA, the Quebec Superior Court has established
the conditions under which a shareholder may bring an action in the name of the corporation.
146
In doing so, the Quebec court has stressed the importance of limiting its superintending role
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individual(s). In other words, it may be more difficult to proceed with such a claim under the
civil law regime since the standing to begin a derivative action is limited to shareholders and
there must be a fraudulent element for it to proceed. Under the CBCA, a derivative action does
not require the presence of a fraudulent element. Rather, the action must be taken in the best
interests of the corporation. Further, the standing isn’t limited to shareholders under the CBCA.
Under federal legislation, the oppression remedy is regarded as being a very powerful tool in
providing shareholder protection. To this day, the Quebec legislature has not followed suit with
its federal counterpart and as a result, litigants are left with section 33 CCPC as a means of
trying to bring such an action in Quebec courts. Over the last couple of years, the Quebec
Superior Court has been more receptive to the idea of extending its superintending and
governing power to offer an action similar to the oppression remedy used in common law
provinces. Even though the court’s power has only been used in relation to cases dealing with
fraud, some judges have been openly considering the idea of broadening the scope of its
superintending and governing power to cases involving abuses of rights or violation of the
legitimate expectations of shareholders, in a manner similar to the federal oppression remedy.
147

In Canada, there are multiple corporate law statutes, with each province and the federal
government having their own statutes. However, all statutes are subject to the interpretation
by the courts, ultimately the Supreme Court of Canada. The Supreme Court is a general court of
appeal and the final authority on the interpretation of the entire body of law in Canada.148 The
Supreme Court’s decisions help to unify the laws within Canada for two reasons. First, they
have the power to interpret both common law and civil law legislation, and second, lower
courts in all provinces must follow the Supreme Court’s decisions, to the extent the facts apply.
This discussion reveals that while Quebec operates a corporate law framework within its civil
law system that on its surface provides legal rules that do not offer as much protection as the
federal corporate law statute (or other provincial law statues), the Quebec courts have stepped
in to judicially craft remedies for shareholders. That being said, these QCA remedies are
currently more difficult to access or achieve recourse under than those in the federal statutory
regime. However, Quebec has recently proposed changes149 to the Quebec Companies Act to
incorporate many of the practices that exist elsewhere in Canada, including better protection
for shareholders, and new governance rules.150 Some of the proposed changes relate to
protections of minority shareholders including new remedies in the event of abuse or inequity.
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Shareholders will have the possibility of tabling a shareholder proposal at company meetings
and a minority shareholder who disagrees with a major change made to the structure or the
activities of the corporation may be able to demand that his shares be repurchased.151 In
addition, shareholders will have the right to ask the Court for the authorization to act in the
name of the corporation, or derivative actions.152 Nonetheless, this does indicate the reflexive
relationship between a civil law province and the common law operating on a national level.

V. CONCLUSION
Perhaps one of the most important results of the LLSV study was to facilitate discussion of how
law impacts the growth of capital markets. As the three case studies in Canada illustrate, the
context of how laws develop is a strong indicator of how and why laws within the capital
markets have developed the way they have. It is not as simple as delineating between common
law and civil law jurisdictions. Rather the political, economic, and historical backgrounds are
some of the important contributors to the development of laws and legal structures.
In this paper I explored the situation of Canada during the recent financial crisis, the efforts to
create a national securities regulator, and the role of Quebec, a civil law jurisdiction, within
federation of common law jurisdictions. In exploring these issues it was clear that the
development of various investor protection laws and structures over time in Canada (as
opposed to a point in time as in the LLSV studies), and also by providing context which helps to
explain why certain rules and structures have been adapted while others, although
economically efficient, may have been rejected. This exploration of Canada highlights that
context matters when looking at the laws related to investor protection within a country. Not
all investor protection mechanisms are located in the corporate statutes, as LLSV assumes. LLSV
do not explore securities law rules, securities law structures, or banking laws. In Canada, as in
many other jurisdictions, securities laws and securities structure have an impact on investor
protection and the debate on a common securities regulator has focused on improving investor
protection and improving enforcement. Furthermore, banking laws and the banking framework
plays an important role in investor protection. In Canada, investor protection is reflected in the
conservative nature of our banking system which allowed Canadian financial institutions to
escape relatively unscathed from the recent financial crisis. Finally, the Canadian system is both
structured and has evolved in such a way that investor protections are fairly consistent
between the common law and civil law provinces, even when the civil law statute does not
necessarily mimic the common law statute. This is because of various unifying bodies such as
the Canadian Securities Administrators for provincial securities laws and the unifying role of the
Supreme Court of Canada for corporate law principles across the country.
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